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Data and Democracy 
My topic tonight is "Data and Democracy." My thesis is simple: since the 
founding of the Republic, the U.s. legal system has fostered exceptionally open 
and vibrant flows of information. In the past twenty five years, however, as our 
economy has grown more information-dependent, the United States' protection 
of the right to access and communicate information has been challenged by 
diverse and expanding efforts to treat data as a valuable commodity that may be 
owned and restricted like other forms of property. Although often motivated by 
laudable goals, these efforts to create and expand property rights in information 
pose a significant threat to each of us as citizens and consumers. 
This topic takes on special significance in the aftermath of the recent terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. To be sure, those attacks 
challenge the openness of our democracy. But they have also demonstrated 
anew the value of vibrant information flows to bind together the nation, 
motivate extraordinary acts of heroism and generosity, identify and locate 
witnesses and suspects, facilitate our recovery, and protect against future 
attacks. So rather than restricting the information flows on which our democracy 
and economy depend, I think-I hope-the more likely effect of the events of 
September 11 will be to make us more aware of the power of our freedom to 
communicate and more vigilant in its defense. But it will mean little if, while 
defending information flows from outside attack, we impede them with a self-
constructed wall of property rights. 
I would like to survey briefly the range of protection under U.S. law for the 
right to access and communicate information and then provide two sets of 
examples of recent developments that threaten to undermine that protection. 
The Right to Access and Communicate Information 
It is widely recognized that information plays a critical role in a democracy. 
Without access to information and the freedom to express ourselves, citizens 
cannot elect leaders and oversee the activities of the government. As James 
Madison wrote almost two centuries ago: /I A popular Government, without 
popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or 
a Tragedy; or perhaps both .... A people who mean to be their own Governors, 
must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives."l The consent of 
the governed is the only legitimate source of sovereign power in a democracy, 
and it is only meaningful if informed. 
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Open information flows, of course, serve other valuable functions in our 
society, such as fostering individual development and self-fulfillment, furthering 
creativity and innovation, advancing science, promoting social evolution, and 
facilitating what the Supreme Court has called a "marketplace of ideas."2 The 
marketplace is more than a metaphor: markets depend on information flows. 
Economists have long regarded access to information as one of the requirements 
of a competitive market and the practical absence of such information as an 
inefficiency, an external cost, and a market failure. 
The First Amendment 
Because information serves such a broad array of values, U.S. law provides 
extraordinary protection for the right to access and communicate data. The 
foundation of that protection is the Constitution, and especially the First 
Amendment-"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press .... " The Supreme Court has interpreted these simple words to 
prevent the government from restricting expression prior to its utterance or 
publication or merely because the government disagrees with the sentiment 
expressed/ and to forbid the government from making impermissible 
distinctions based on content,4 compelling speech, or granting access to the 
expressive capacity of another5 without demonstrating that the government's 
action is the least restrictive means for accomplishing a compelling 
governmental purpose. 
Under the First Amendment, the Court has significantly limited recovery for 
defamation or invasion of privacy. Public officials and public figures may not 
recover for damage caused by false expression unless they can demonstrate with 
"convincing clarity" that the publisher knew of the falsity or was reckless 
concerning it.6 And the Court has eliminated entirely any recourse by public 
plaintiffs for the publication of true information, even if highly defamatory or 
personaF Other plaintiffs can recover for the harm caused by the publication of 
false and defamatory expression-if that expression is on a matter of public 
interest-only if the plaintiff can prove its falsity, an exceptionally difficult 
burden.s 
When information is true and obtained lawfully, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly held that the government may not restrict its disclosure without 
showing a very closely tailored, compelling governmental interest-" strict 
scrutiny" -the highest level of constitutional scrutiny. Under this requirement, 
the Court has struck down laws restricting the publication of confidential 
government reports/ and of the names of judges under investigation,10 juvenile 
suspects,l1 and rape victims.12 
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Virtually without exception, the Court has upheld the right to speak or 
publish or protest under the First Amendment, to the detriment of privacy 
interests. The Court has rejected privacy claims by unwilling viewers or listeners 
in the context of broadcasts of radio programs in city streetcars,13 R-rated movies 
at a drive-in theater,14 and a jacket bearing a phrase that one publisher refused to 
print but instead made me describe as an "unseemly expletive," worn in the 
corridors of a courthouse.15 
The Court interprets the First Amendment to restrict not merely Congress, 
but all federal and state governmental agencies,16 and to protect expression that 
the Court has determined does not independently warrant protection (such as 
false or defamatory expression),17 conduct that involves no speech (such as 
burning a flag or picketing),18 and activities ancillary to expression (such as 
funding expression).19 
This protection, as these examples suggest, is by no means limited to 
noncommercial expression. Beginning in 1976, when the Supreme Court first 
extended the protection of the First Amendment to wholly commercial 
expression, our judicial system has recognized that readily available information 
and the legal right to express it are critical to the functioning of competitive 
markets. In that case, in which the Court struck down a Virginia statute that 
prohibited the advertising of pharmaceutical prices, the Court wrote: 
It is clear ... that speech does not lose its First Amendment protection 
because money is spent to project it, as in a paid advertisement of one form 
or another. Speech likewise is protected even though it is carried in a form 
that is "sold" for profit, and even though it may involve a solicitation to 
purchase or otherwise payor contribute money .... 
[T]he particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial 
information ... may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the 
day's most urgent political debate.20 
Just this past June, the Supreme Court reiterated the remarkable nature of 
the u.s. legal system's protection for expression when it held that even the 
broadcast of an illegally intercepted cellular telephone conversation was protected 
by the First Amendment. The Court wrote: 
Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a 
civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life 
in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press. 
"Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, 
must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to 
enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period." ... 
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"Moreover, 'our decisions establish that absent exceptional circumstances, 
reputational interests alone cannot justify the proscription of truthful 
speech.' "21 
The Copyright Clause 
The First Amendment is not the only constitutional provision protecting 
information flows. The Copyright Clause recognizes the value of expression by 
empowering Congress to create an incentive for its creation. As the Supreme 
Court has written, copyright is "the engine of free expression. By establishing a 
marketplace right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the 
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas."22 
Copyright law demonstrates how much we value the ability to access and 
use information in another way, as well. Neither it, nor any other branch of U.S. 
intellectual property law, permits ownership of data. Instead, copyright law 
protects only expression. In the words of the unanimous Supreme Court: "The 
most fundamental axiom of copyright law is that '[n]o author may copyright his 
ideas or the facts he narrates .... ' [C]opyright assures authors the right to their 
original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and 
information conveyed by a work."23 
Although it may seem unfair that the law does not allow a creator or 
discoverer of data to own them, "this is not 'some unforeseen byproduct of a 
statutory scheme,'" the Court has written. "It is, rather, 'the essence of 
copyright,' and a constitutional requirement."24 
Given the constitutional importance of not extending copyright protection to 
facts or ideas, courts will not even protect expression if it includes one of a 
limited number of ways of conveying an idea, concept, or fact, or if it is 
necessary to implementing an idea or concept. Under the doctrine of "merger," 
courts withhold copyright protection from expression that "must necessarily be 
used as incident to" the work's underlying ideas or data.25 In that situation, 
courts find that the expression and the underlying idea or fact have "merged."26 
The doctrine of merger highlights the importance of preventing copyright law 
from ever protecting a fact or idea: it is preferable to exclude otherwise 
protectable expression from copyright law's monopoly rather than to allow that 
monopoly to extend to any fact or idea. 
Open Records and Open Meetings Laws 
In addition to these constitutional provisions, statutes and regulations also 
demonstrate a sweeping preference for open information flows. For example, 
Congress and every state legislature have enacted laws guaranteeing access to 
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public records and government meetings. Although because of separation of 
powers issues, these laws do not apply to the judiciary, the Supreme Court has 
found a constitutional right of access to every phase of a criminal trial and to 
judicial records as well. 27 Access is required even over the objections of both the 
defendant and the prosecution/8 and may be restricted only when necessary to 
serve a compelling state interest. 
Mandatory Disclosure in the Marketplace 
This commitment to access is not limited to government information and 
bodies. Mandatory disclosure is at the heart of virtually all market regulation 
and consumer protection law. In 1988 the Supreme Court wrote that: '''There 
cannot be honest markets without honest publicity. Manipulation and 
dishonest practices of the market place thrive upon mystery and secrecy.' " 29 
The "fundamental purpose," therefore, of U.S. industry regulation is to 
implement" I a philosophy of full disclosure.' " 30 This philosophy is reflected in 
thousands of laws requiring mandatory disclosure of critical information in 
every facet of our lives-from notices of borrowers' rights in banks to food 
labeling. 
In sum, then, as the Federal Reserve Board has written, "it is the freedom to 
speak, supported by the availability of information and the free-flow of data, 
that is the cornerstone of a democratic society and market economy."31 
The Growing Threat to Data Access and Use 
Against this panoply of legal protections for the right to access and use 
information, we are witnessing the emergence of new laws, and new 
applications and interpretations of existing laws, that would treat information as 
property or invest individuals with property-like rights in data. These have the 
effect of undermining that protection for information flows. 
Unfortunately, there are many examples. I would like to examine briefly 
efforts to commodify information in just two areas of law: copyright and 
privacy. 
Copyright 
The constitutional purpose of copyright law, you will recall, is to facilitate 
expression. However, recent changes in that law to expand the rights of 
copyright holders and reduce the rights of copyright users threaten to frustrate 
that purpose. 
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1. Duration 
Nowhere is this clearer than in the length of copyright protection. The 
duration of copyright has grown from a 14-year term, which could be renewed 
by the creator once, in the first U.s. Copyright Act in 1790/2 to life of the author 
plus 70 years today. For anonymous or pseudonymous works, or works created 
by institutions, protection today lasts for 120 years after creation or 95 years after 
publication.33 
One might reasonably wonder whether 70 years of posthumous protection 
creates any additional incentive to create, while it defers for that much longer 
the moment when a work becomes part of the public domain. Lord Macaulay 
spoke to this issue in 1841 when Parliament was considering extending the term 
of British copyright protection: 
Now, would the knowledge, that this copyright would exist in 1841, 
have been a source of gratification to [Dr.] Johnson? Would it have 
stimulated his exertions? Would it have once drawn him out of his bed 
before noon? Would it have once cheered him under a fit of the spleen? 
Would it have induced him to give us one more allegory, one more life of a 
poet, one more imitation of Juvenal? I firmly believe not. ... Show me that 
the prospect of this boon roused him to any vigorous effort, or sustained his 
spirits under depressing circumstances, and I am quite willing to pay the 
price of such an object, heavy as that price is. But what I do complain of is 
that my circumstances are to be worse, and Johnson's fare none the better, 
that I am to give five pounds for what to him was not worth a farthing. 34 
2. Subject Matter 
Congress has also aggressively expanded the subject matter of copyright. 
The first Copyright Act applied only to maps, charts, and books. By the time it 
passed the 1909 Act, Congress had expanded the scope of copyright law to cover 
"all of the writings of an author," provided that they were published. In 1976, 
Congress eliminated the publication requirement. To qualify for protection 
today, a work must be "fixed"-that is, captured in some "tangible medium of 
expression" like paper, computer disk, or video tape-and" original" -meaning 
only "independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other 
works)."35 These requirements are deliberately broad and easy to satisfy. 
Congress and the courts have also expanded copyright to protect virtually 
anything that can be expressed-even plots, characters, choreography, basketball 
plays, page numbers, the selection and arrangement of otherwise 
uncopyrightable facts, sculpture, esthetic shapes, architecture, and the "look and 
feel" of computer programs. 
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Through revisions in 1976 and 1988,36 Congress also eliminated the 
requirement that owners of copyrighted works must register their works with 
the Copyright Office and affix a proper copyright notice to each copy. Today, 
protection begins as soon as expression is fixed: no intent to cQPyright, no notice 
of copyright, and no application to the government are necessary. This has 
expanded exponentially the number of works subject to copyright. Copyright 
law now protects every letter, memo, note, home video, answering machine 
message, e-mail, and doodle. 
3. Rights 
Congress has also recently created new rights for copyright holders in the 
Digital Millennium Copyright ACt.37 Since 1976, and substantially since 1909, 
copyright law has given a creator, or, in some circumstances, a creator's 
employer,38 the exclusive rights to reproduce, adapt, distribute, publicly perform, 
and publicly display a copyrighted work, and to authorize anyone else to do 
these things.39 With passage of the DMCA in 1998, Congress greatly expanded 
copyright holders' rights. 
The DMCA prohibits the circumvention of technological measures taken by 
copyright owners to control access to their works.40 It also prohibits 
"manufactur[ing], import[ing], offer[ing] to the public, provid[ing], or otherwise 
traffic[ing] in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part 
thereof" that is primarily designed to circumvent technological measures . 
designed to control access to a work.41 These provisions apply even if the 
circumvention is necessary to obtain lawful access-access permitted by federal 
copyright law. So, for example, while a copyright holder may not use copyright 
law to prevent access to factual information, which by definition cannot be 
protected by copyright law, he or she may encrypt that information and then use 
copyright law to prosecute anyone who tries to circumvent the encryption. 
Moreover, by broadly prohibiting the manufacture and sale of devices that 
circumvent encryption, the new law effectively eliminates the availability of 
such devices even for lawful uses. 
Similarly, the DMCA prohibits the removal or alteration of "copyright' 
management information" -information conveyed with a copyrighted work that 
identifies the author or performer and the terms and conditions for the use of the 
work.42 Yet it is often impossible or impractical to include the copyright notice 
when parodying a song, quoting a book, or videotaping a television program for 
later viewing. While the Supreme Court has ruled that all three of these activities 
are legitimate uses of copyrighted work, under the defense of "fair use," the 
failure to include the complete original copyright notice could nevertheless 
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subject the user to statutory fines as great as $25,000 per incident, injunctions, 
damages, costs, attorney's fees, and even criminal prosecutionY 
Finally, under the DMCA, providers of Internet access, like AOL or 
Earthlink or Indiana University, are liable for data they "store," if, after receiving 
notice of a copyright holder's" good faith belief" that infringement is occurring, 
the service provider does not "respond expeditiously to remove, or disable 
access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing."44 Think what this means: 
to avoid liability under the DMCA, a service provider must remove the material 
stored on its servers by its customers before any adjudication that the material is 
infringing or that the infringement is not excused by any defense un~er the 
copyright law. The law thus creates a tremendous incentive to turn service 
providers into copyright censors, blocking access to material that may ultimately 
prove to be wholly lawful. 
These concerns are not fanciful. During the last presidential race, the George 
W. Bush campaign sent a cease and desist letter to Zack Exley, the creator of 
gwbush.com, a parody of the official campaign Web site, threatening legal action 
for what the letter characterized as Exley'S "graft" of "inappropriate" material 
onto the "words, look and feel of the Exploratory Committee's site." "There 
ought to be limits to freedom" the Bush campaign said in a statement about the 
case posted on its official Web site.45 As we see with the expansion of copyright 
holders' rights, increasingly there are. 
4. Defenses 
In addition to the expansion in duration, subject matter, and rights reflected 
in copyright law, there has been a parallel reduction in the defenses provided by 
that law. The most important of these defenses is "fair use." Fair use expressly 
permits certain uses of copyrighted works that serve important public purposes 
and that do not harm the market for the original work. The 1976 Copyright Act 
sets out four factors for courts to consider when determining whether an 
otherwise infringing use is fair: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.46 
Courts often focus on the fourth factor. According to the Supreme Court, 
unauthorized uses of copyrighted works are unfair (1) if it is proved that the 
particular use is harmful to the market for the original work, or (2) if it is shown 
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by a preponderance of the evidence that "should [the use] become widespread, 
it would adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work."47 
Historically, a use such as copying a page from an article or a frame from a 
motion picture would likely have been found to be fair, because it involved 
copying only a small portion of a larger work and there was no market for that 
portion alone. Today, however, such a use is far less likely to be found fair, 
because technologies like the Internet make possible markets for per-page or 
per-line licenses. As a result, almost any use, if widespread, could" adversely 
affect the potential market for the copyrighted work." 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals demonstrated this in 1994 in American 
Geophysical Union v. Texaco.48 The court faced the issue of whether a Texaco 
scientist's unauthorized copying of eight articles from the Journal of Catalysis 
over four years constituted fair use. The court did not focus on the impact of the 
copying on the market for subscriptions to the complete journal or on sales of 
back issues and back volumes. Instead, the court stressed the copying's likely 
impact on the publisher's ability to negotiate licenses to photocopy individual 
articles. By redefining the market to include licenses for portions of whole journal 
issues, the court negated Texaco's argument that such limited copying had no 
likely market impact: 
Despite Texaco's claims to the contrary, it is not unsound to conclude 
that the right to seek payment for a particular use tends to become legally 
cognizable under the fourth fair use factor when the means for paying for 
such a use is made easier. This notion is not inherently troubling: it is 
sensible that a particular unauthorized use should be considered "more fair" 
when there is no ready market or means to pay for the use, while such an 
unauthorized use should be considered "less fair" when there is a ready 
market or means to pay for the use .... Whatever the situation may have 
been previously, before the development of a market for institutional users 
to obtain licenses to photocopy articles, it is now appropriate to consider the 
loss of licensing revenues in evaluating "the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of" journal articles.49 
As computers create markets in smaller and smaller fragments of 
works-licensing their reproduction by the line or column inch-uses that were 
fair in print will likely cease to be so in the context of digital information. 
Moreover, the fair use defense does not apply to the new actions created by 
the DMCA for circumventing technological protections, altering or removing 
copyright management information, or failing to remove information stored on a 
server after receiving a complaint of copyright infringement. As a result, even if 
fair use protects a use such as a quote from or parody of a copyrighted work, it 
9 
will not excuse decrypting the work to engage in the fair use or failing to include 
the complete copyright management information along with the quote or 
parody. 
5. Contracts 
The final development is the extent to which contract law is supplanting 
copyright law as a source of rights for protecting works, particularly in the 
digital environment. Database providers, such as Lexis and Westlaw, have long 
relied on contracts to govern access to, and control reuse of, material contained 
in their databases, even when that material includes noncopyrightable 
government documents and public domain material. Copyright holders license 
almost all software, subject to contract terms, rather than sell it outright. And 
this trend recently gained support with adoption of the Uniform Computer 
Information Transactions Act. That Act reflects a concerted effort to use mass 
market licenses, instead of copyright law, for all transfers of "computer 
information transactions" -not only software, but" electronically disseminated" 
news, opinions, pictures, and the like.50 
These licenses are used to protect rights that go far beyond those provided 
by copyright law. For example, they can restrict the use of facts or ideas. They 
can last indefinitely. They can be used to limit criticism or the development of 
new and competing materials. They seldom provide for any of the defenses 
included in copyright law-including fair use-and they often include penalties 
and conditions far more severe than those provided by copyright law. Contracts 
are proving to be an important means for controlling access to information. 
Summary 
Collectively, these changes in U.s. copyright law greatly expand the rights of 
copyright holders and provide them with the legal tools to prevent access to, or 
use of, the contents of copyrighted works altogether. 
Let me offer a very practical example, drawn from my own experience, of 
how the expansion in copyright law and the use of contracts can be used 
effectively to create property rights in information itself and then be used to 
stifle the valuable information flows. 
Indiana University hosts the Thesaurus Musicarum Latinarum, a five million-
word full-text database developed over the past ten years by a consortium of 
U.S. universities, under the leadership of Thomas J. Mathiesen, David H. Jacobs 
Distinguished Professor of Music. The goal of the TML is to digitize the entire 
corpus of Latin music theory from the Middle Ages through the Renaissance. 
The TML is made available to scholars via the Internet, free of charge. The 
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database includes digital images of diagrams that appear within the treatises 
drawn from medieval manuscripts housed in libraries around the world. 
Six years ago, the Bodleian Library in Oxford objected to the TML's use of 
several images from Bodley 842, a 14th-century musical manuscript in the 
Bodleian's collection. The Bodleian claimed that the picture violated the 
Library's copyright, not in the manuscript (which being 700 years old had long 
ago become part of the public domain), but in the photographs of the manuscript. 
We pointed out that the law in both the United Kingdom and the United States 
requires some modicum of originality; the caselaw therefore clearly established 
that there is no copyright protection available for photographs that merely 
exactly reproduce works that are too old to be subject to copyright law.51 
The Bodleian was not finished, however. In the absence of a copyright 
interest, the Library asserted that the only way to obtain a copy of the image of 
the treatise was to order one from the Bodleian and that the Bodleian Library 
Photographic Services Order Form contains contract language, to which the user 
must agree. The form limits the use of any image to "research" purposes. When 
we challenged-on both factual and doctrinal grounds-this use of contract to 
assert control over the contents of a 14th-century manuscript, the Bodleian 
responded by rejecting a routine order for slides from Indiana University's 
Library with an e-mail stating that because of this dispute "the Bodleian cannot 
accept any institutional order from Indiana University for new photographic 
materials or for the renewal of old ones." 
The dispute is a straightforward one. The Bodleian-like many libraries, 
businesses, and other organizations-sought to expand its property rights in 
public domain material to include not only the right to possess and control use 
of the actual document, but also the right to control use of the content and exact 
reproductions of the document. When copyright law, even as recently expanded, 
proved unavailing, the Bodleian turned to contract law in an effort to expand its 
monopoly. The argument was not about price or terms (although it easily could 
have been). In its earliest correspondence, the Bodleian wrote that its "rule is not 
to allow Bodleian images to be mounted on other sites" and that it has "no 
immediate plans" to digitize these images on its own site. The argument was 
about whether the Indiana University, the TML, or any other scholarly resource 
could have access at all. 
When considering the 1909 Copyright Act, Congress wrote that: "The 
enactment of copyright legislation by Congress is not based upon any natural 
right that the author has in his writings ... but upon the ground that the welfare of 
the public will be served and progress of science and the useful arts will be 
promoted by securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their 
writingS."52 Almost a century later, we have moved far from that original purpose. 
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Copyright law today applies to every imaginable form of expression; its protection 
attaches immediately and automatically and lasts for generations. The rights that 
copyright law protects have expanded, while the defenses to infringement are 
contracting and, in the case of the new rights provided by the DMCA, have 
disappeared altogether. And, at least in new arenas for commerce and discourse 
such as the Internet, it appears that private contracts may replace copyright 
entirely. Legal scholars have described these developments as an "intellectual 
land-grab"S3 and a "creeping enclosure of the informational commons."54 
Unchecked they threaten the public'S ability to access and use information. 
Privacy 
Another area in which information flows are being threatened by new laws 
and a new focus on property rights is that of information privacy. 
The Privacy Avalanche 
The past five years have witnessed a surge in legislation, regulation, and 
litigation designed to protect the privacy of personal information. In 1998 
Congress adopted legislation restricting the collection and use of information 
from children online,5s and the following year enacted the first comprehensive 
federal financial privacy legislation as part of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial 
Services Modernization Act,56 as well as the first federal law prohibiting access to 
historically open public records without individual" opt-in" consent.57 Federal 
regulators have not only implemented these and other privacy laws, but have 
also adopted sweeping health privacy rules under the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act.s8 The Federal Trade Commission reversed its 
longstanding position and released two proposals for legislation concerning 
adult's online privacy.S9 And Congress and state legislatures have considered 
more than 600 privacy bills while state attorneys general have initiated 
aggressive privacy investigations and litigation. 
The Transformation of Privacy Law 
The result has been a transformation in not only the volume, but also the 
object, of privacy law. Historically, U.s. privacy law focused on two broad 
themes. The first was preventing intrusion by the government. The second theme 
was, when privacy laws did address private-sector behavior, preventing specific, 
identified harms to consumers. 
The dominant trend in these recent enactments is to invest consumers with 
near absolute control over information in the marketplace-irrespective of whether 
the information is, or could be, used to cause harm. Public officials and privacy 
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advocates argue that "we must assure consumers that they have full control over 
their personal information."60 Virtually all of the privacy bills pending before 
Congress reflect this goal: "To strengthen control by consumers" and "to provide 
greater individual control."61 William Safire sununed up this movement towards 
turning information into property when he wrote in the New York Times: "Your 
bank account, your health record, your genetic code, your personal and 
shopping habits and sexual interests are your own business. That information 
has value. If anybody wants to pay for an intimate look inside your life, let them 
make you an offer and you'll think about it. "62 
These new enactments do exactly that. Take the recently adopted health 
privacy rules. Under those rules, which take effect in April 2003, individuals are 
given the right to control virtually all uses of "health information" about them.63 
Or consider Congress' 1999 amendments to the Drivers Privacy Protection Act, 
which compelled states to restrict the disclosure of motor vehicle records unless 
individual motorists consented to the disclosure.64 
Rather than striking down laws like these that threaten access to, and 
communication of, information, the Supreme Court has endorsed them as 
legitimate economic regulation. In an unanimous opinion upholding the DPP A, 
the Court wrote that "the personal, identifying information that the DPPA 
regulates is a 'thing in interstate commerce,'" and referred to that information 
throughout its opinion simply as "an article in interstate commerce," like a 
truckload of coal or stee1.65 This stands in stark contrast to the considerable 
protection that the Court has interpreted the First Amendment as applying to 
expression. 
Similarly, just three months earlier, the Court had upheld the 
constitutionality of a California statute that prohibited the release of arrestee 
addresses to anyone for the purpose of using them to sell a product or service.66 
The statute explicitly permitted such information to be used for "journalistic" 
purposes. Nevertheless, the Court rejected the argument that it was 
unconstitutional (as well as nonsensical) to seek to protect the privacy of 
arrestees by prohibiting attorneys and private investigators from sending letters 
offering their services, while permitting publication of arrestee names and 
addresses in the newspaper. The Court went even further, however, to write that 
"California could decide not to give out arrestee information at all without 
violating the First Amendment."67 
Granting individuals control over uses of information about them in the 
absence of evidence of harm-much less blocking access altogether-not only 
ignores the constitutional protection of open information flows, it also has very 
practical consequences. Many of those consequences relate to our use of 
information to monitor public officials and the activities of our government. For 
example: 
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• By systematically examining local government records, San Francisco 
Examiner reporter Candy Cooper discovered that police investigated 
rapes in upscale Berkeley far more readily than in the crime-infested 
neighborhoods of Oakland. 
• The Associated Press used Social Security Numbers to match Mississippi 
Department of Correction and Department of Education records to 
discover eight school teachers who had failed to report that they had 
been convicted of crimes including drug dealing and sex offenses. 
• The St. Petersburg Times searched public records to discover that a man 
running for city treasurer had not disclosed that he had filed for 
personal bankruptcy three times and corporate bankruptcy twice, and 
that the new director of a large arts organization that solicited donations 
had been charged with fraud in his home state. 
• Tampa's News Channel 8 mapped the location of all drug arrests to 
uncover a narcotics ring across the street from an elementary school. 
A recent study by Professor Brooke Barnett, when she was a Knight Fellow 
at Indiana University's School of Journalism, found that journalists routinely use 
records, including those restricted by the DPP A, not merely to check facts, but 
actually to identify the story in the first place. According to that study, 64 
percent of all crime-related stories, 57 percent of all city or state stories, 56 
percent of all investigative stories, and 47 percent of all political campaign 
stories rely on public records. Access to public record databases, Professor 
Barnett writes, is "a necessity for journalists to uncover wrongdoing and 
effectively cover crime, political stories and investigative pieces. " 68 
Allowing individuals to exercise control over information, in the absence of 
any specific threat of harm, also has consequences in our society and economy 
more broadly. For example, public and commercial records are used to locate 
missing family members, owners of lost or stolen property, organ and tissue 
donors, alumni and members of associations and religious groups, suspects and 
witnesses in criminal and civil matters, tax evaders, and parents who are 
delinquent in child support payments. Firestone and Ford Motor Company used 
those records to identify and obtain current addresses for people who needed to 
receive information on replacing defective tires. 
Data are used extensively in the market. Ubiquitous credit reports, for 
example, mean that Americans are judged based on our own credit history and 
qualifications, not stereotypes based on where we live, how old we are, or the 
color of our skin. Those records have literally transformed the financial services 
sector of our country. Banks, credit card issuers, insurers and others make more 
services available to more people, on a more equitable basis, and at lower cost 
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than ever before. For example, because lenders today rely on accessible credit 
information collected from diverse sources over time, they provide more loans 
to a wider range of people than ever before. Between 1956 and 1998, the number 
of U.s. households with mortgages more than trebled. The very completeness of 
those credit records means that lenders will provide service to previously 
unserved populations. A 2000 World Bank study, for example, showed that 
restrictive privacy laws would eliminate 11 out of every 100 people who 
currently qualify for mortgages, credit cards, and other loans. 69 
Accessible credit records increase the speed with which credit decisions are 
made. In 1997, 82 perce,nt of automobile loan applicants received a decision 
within an hour; 48 percent of applicants received a decision within 30 minutes. 
Many retailers open new charge accounts for customers at the point of sale in 
less than two minutes. The greater accuracy, speed, and efficiency of the credit 
system, and the greater confidence of lenders, also drive down the cost of 
credit-by an estimated $80 billion per year for mortgages alone.70 
These benefits derive from the fact that information is obtained routinely, 
over time, without the consumers having control over the information. Allowing 
the consumer to block the collection or use of unfavorable information would 
make the credit report and other public and commercial records useless. 
Some benefits transcend either political or economic considerations. This is 
especially true in the context of health privacy, both because of the extent to 
which the development of new treatments and drugs depends on the 
widespread availability of information, and because of the important distinction 
between privacy of the body-the right to refuse treatment or to choose among 
medically appropriate treatments-and privacy of information about the body. 
Helena Gail Rubenstein has written that "Privacy, which is intertwined with the 
concept of control over what is disseminated about oneself, is an expression of 
autonomy . . .. [W]hile autonomy is an appropriate framework for evaluating 
questions concerning the treatment of one's body, it is not the appropriate 
framework for evaluating rules to regulate the use of health data."7l This is 
precisely because of the many other valuable uses that those data have. 
Those who wish to condition the collection and use of health-related 
information on consent-without regard for the value of its other uses or its 
potential for causing harm-refuse to recognize "in exchange for the vast 
improvements in medical care, a correlative responsibility on the part of the 
individual, as a consumer of health care services, toward the community." 
Rubenstein continues: "As individuals rely on their right to be let alone, 
they shift the burden for providing the data needed to advance medical and 
health policy information. Their individualist vision threatens the entire 
comm uni ty .... " 72 
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The FBI's efforts to identify and bring to justice the terrorists who attacked 
the Pentagon and W orId Trade Center and to protect against future terrorist 
attacks, also demonstrate vividly the value of information collected in the 
marketplace and the need for such information in the future. 
Professor Eugene Volokh has written: "The difficulty is that the right to 
information privacy-my right to control your communication of personally 
identifiable information about me-is a right to have the government stop you 
from speaking about me.//73 Expanding the realm of information over which we 
allow individuals to exercise control-without regard for harm-not only 
threatens the constitutional doctrine of the First Amendment, but poses practical 
and significant risks to our democracy and society as well. 
Conclusion 
It is ironic that these developments in copyright and privacy law reflect 
almost oppositive objectives. Businesses have lobbied Congress and litigated 
aggressively to expand the monopoly granted them by copyright law and 
thereby to exact greater compensation from individuals who wish to access and 
use copyrighted works and the information they contain. Recent privacy laws, 
by contrast, reflect an effort to give individuals greater control of the information 
about them that businesses wish to collect and use. Both efforts, however, have 
the effect of creating property-like rights in information that threaten to choke 
the information flows on which our democracy and economy depend. 
Unlike direct attacks on expression, which courts have almost uniformly 
repelled, efforts to create ownership and control of information are far more 
subtle and insidious. Motivated by changes in markets and technologies, and 
especially the growth in the information services economy, these efforts to 
commodify data, and thereby restrict their use, are rarely even seen as a threat to 
traditionally protected expression interests. So few constitutional objections have 
been raised, and courts have proved only occasionally sympathetic when they 
are. 
Recognizing that threat does not necessarily mean that laws creating greater 
control over information are universally undesirable or should always be 
repudiated. Rather, it sets the stage for balancing laws that restrict information 
flows with the constitutional prot~ction for those flows. Where the former are 
necessary to respond to sufficiently significant harms, the latter may have to give 
way. But we should reach that conclusion explicitly, carefully, and reluctantly. 
I anticipate that, if explicitly balanced against the benefits of accessible 
information in our democracy and economy, many recent enactments that create 
property rights in information would fall. Some would fall because under the 
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additional scrutiny of constitutional analysis, they would be seen not to serve 
any beneficial interest at all. Others would fall because they would not be the 
least restrictive means of achieving an otherwise laudable objective. But most 
would fall because the damage to our democracy and economy of compromising 
our commitment to open information flows-even for a worthy objective-would 
simply be too great. 
One hundred years ago the Michigan Supreme Court rejected an effort to 
expand that state's privacy laws. The words it used then seem equally applicable 
today: 
We do not wish to be understood as belittling the complaint. We have 
no reason to doubt the feeling of annoyance alleged. Indeed, we sympathize 
with it, and marvel at the impertinence that does not respect it. We can only 
say that it is one of the ills that, under the law, cannot be redressed.74 
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